How the Neglect of Innovation Nearly Cost Britain the War Against Hitler

One of the many lessons we should remember from Word War II is that England's neglect of innovation nearly cost it the war against Germany. This is a minor but important aspect of a major new book on England's fight to survive in World War II. In Churchill and Orwell: The Fight for Freedom by Pulitzer-prize winning author Thomas E. Ricks (New York: Penguin, 2017), we learn about some of the reasons England struggled to defend itself from Germany. A key weakness discussed by Ricks was England's poor state of preparation with inadequate machinery, feeble industrialization, weak supply chains, etc., that made it hard to fight a serious war and led to embarrassing disasters like the rapid loss of Singapore, their imagined secure fortress in southeast Asia.

Closer to home in Europe, Britain often had a hard time just moving their troops around -- they often had to walk -- and the Brits were amazed at how quickly their American cousins could mobilize when they came to the rescue. Why was England so poorly prepared?

England, of course, was the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, yet by the time of the War, they were far behind in many of the basic technologies they would need. How could this happen? Ricks provides helpful insight in this passage from pages 203-204:

Managed by family members more interested in reaping dividends than investing in new machinery and other gear, “British firms were unable to adopt modern, best-practice technology,” concluded business historian Alfred D. Chandler Jr. As a consequence, Britain’s brilliant university research generally did not make the transition into factories. Britain had led the first Industrial Revolution of coal and steam power, but generally sat out the “Second Industrial Revolution” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, built around oil, chemicals, metals, electricity, electronics, and light machinery, such as automobiles. By the end of the 1940s, it would have neither an empire nor an economy capable of competing with those of other major powers. As Correlli Barnett put it, the reality was that by the time World War II ended, the British “had already written the broad scenario for Britain’s postwar descent to the place of fifth in the free world as an industrial power, with manufacturing output only two fifths of West Germany’s.” Interestingly, Barnett was the keeper of the Churchill Archives at Cambridge University from 1977 to 1995.

Something similar happened in China, which once led the world in innovation and GDP, but from the Qing Dynasty until the late 20th Century, in part due to apathetic leaders unwilling to invest in or even open the doors to innovation and technology, China missed out on much of the Industrial Revolution. Only through massive reform and exerted effort in recent decades has China begun its return to a position of global leadership in innovation, IP creation, and economic growth.

In the paper industry, which I've been close to for many years, it's clear that the American paper industry has largely fallen into the same trap that nearly cost Britain its freedom and did cost many lives unnecessarily. The American paper industry has largely failed to invest in new technology and relies heavily on antiquated paper machines and pulp mills that are decades behind what we have in Asia (China and Japan in particular). Their slower, less efficient machines and less efficient plantations put them at a distinct cost disadvantage. Instead of taking steps to compete better, the US industry too often tries to rely on protective legislation to raise tariffs on imported paper and make everyone in the nation pay much more for their paper than they should. The real problem is not Chinese competition, but American businessmen falling into the same pattern that nearly cost Britain the war: focusing on immediate profit and dividends while neglecting the future.

Each industry, whatever it is, needs to build for the future with investment in innovation and a willingness to boldly cope with the threats and opportunities of disruptive innovation. If your industry is dominated with leaders who feel like they can just milk their business as a cache cow with no need to invest in the future, that industry will fail.

Speaking at China IP Focus 2012, Shanghai, Sept. 20-21, 2012

One of my favorite recent IP conferences was just held in Shanghai. It was the China Intellectual Property Focus 2012 held at the Doubletree Hotel in PuDong. We got to hear extensively from a recently retired Supreme Court Justice, Judge Jiang Zhipei, who shared much about the development of IP law in China and the bold path China is pursuing. We also heard from Ben Wang, R&D leader for Unilever in China, and from many other authorities from Europe, the US, and especially China.

On the second day, I shared my perspectives about the role of IP strategy in dealing with disruptive innovation, and including some of my thoughts about Chinese companies and the lack of respect they get from the West when it comes to innovation and IP. My main point, though, was that large companies need to have aggressive IP-generators who help mitigate future risks by building low-cost but aggressive IP estates in emerging areas and in potentially disruptive areas. Risk aversion is the battle cry, but the "hidden agenda" is actually to help the company prepare for future opportunities in those areas. With proactive IP filed early, when the business units of the company later recognize the importance of market trends and see or feel the need to pursue areas that once looked a little too non-standard/disruptive for comfort, well, when that happens, it won't be too late as is usually the case with disruptive innovation, but the company will find that they are actually prepared with a foundation of IP that can help them survive and move forward more easily.

The application of "disruptive IP strategy" involves some risk and cost, but the costs can be contained and the potential benefits can be huge. A handful of visionary people can help create future-looking IP much more easily than they can convince the company to change directions and make massive investments in new areas. But that IP can later help save the day when the significance of a disruptive threat or opportunity is recognized, often several years down the road.

There were some excellent questions on this topic, including one about the difference in resources and skills between Western companies and Chinese companies. There was a perception, though, that Western companies must be really good at dealing with disruptive innovation and being proactive with their IP. Not so! They are as clumsy and short-sighted as ever, and the opportunity for Chinese companies to seize the future with disruptive innovation and disruptive IP is great. In fact, it's already happening in some quarters. The need for all of us to be more aware and more proactive with out IP is serious.